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NEW YORK STATE CLUB AssocmmA0N, INc. V. CITY OF NEW
YORK: As "DISTINCTLY PRIVATE" Is DEFINED,
WOMEN GAIN ACCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
Society and the judicial system have struggled to determine to what
extent personal liberty and freedom of association should be sacrificed
to provide fairness in the workplace.' Federal and state civil rights acts
and public accommodation laws 2 have attempted to find an equitable
balance between the two clashing values.3 Until 1984, no state or city
had enacted an ordinance that modernized business opportunities for
women in our society.
4
In New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 5 the United
States Supreme Court unanimously upheld a New York City ordinance
containing a "three-prong test" used to determine if a club or associa-
tion qualifies as a "private exemption" under the public accommodation
laws. 6 The Court's decision, which upheld the New York City ordinance
against freedom of association and equal protection facial attacks, leaves
society with a model ordinance to follow in its attempt to curb discrimi-
nation against women in the business world. 7 This Comment will trace
the historical development of the constitutional right of freedom of as-
sociation and outline the evolution of public accommodation laws which
have attempted to define "distinctly private." It will then analyze the
Supreme Court's holding in New York Club Association and its impact on
opportunity for women in the work place. Finally, this Comment will
show why the decision is proper from a constitutional and a societal
standpoint.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Right of Association
Freedom of association is fundamental to the liberty of every indi-
vidual 8 and has been recognized to embody the choice not to associate
with others. 9 Though freedom of association is not an enumerated con-
1. See infra notes 9-69 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
6. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.
8. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) ("freedom of
association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty").
9. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (recognized the right
of the individual to "refuse to associate").
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stitutional right, 10 it has evolved from the first amendment. 11 The right
of association was first recognized in 1958 by the United States Supreme
Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.12 In Patterson, the NAACP
refused to disclose the names and addresses of its members to the state
of Alabama.' 3 The Supreme Court found the NAACP members' right
of association would be violated by an involuntary disclosure of the
NAACP membership lists. 1 4 The Court concluded that any state action
attempting to infringe upon freedom of association is subject to a review
of "the closest scrutiny."' 5 Additionally, the Court, in using the strict
scrutiny test, found the state's disclosure requirement was not ade-
quately compelling to allow an infringement on the NAACP members'
freedom of association. 16 Thus, in Patterson, the Supreme Court created
a constitutionally protected freedom of association which groups could
assert, similar to the protection given to individual members of a group
under the first amendment.17
Following its decision in Patterson, the Supreme Court extended the
freedom of association to protect political parties' 8 and organizations' 9
from attempted government restrictions.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 the United States Supreme Court broad-
ened the scope of the right of association. In the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Douglas declared the right of association as belonging to the
penumbra of the first amendment, 2' and used the right as a safeguard
10. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (right of privacy protected from state interference is a fundamental interest within
the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments), the Court has recognized and expanded
rights not enumerated in the Constitution. See infra notes 20-38 and accompanying text;
see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (legislation prohibiting abortion in state
found to be a violation of individual privacy rights).
I1. See id. at 483 (holding freedom of association as a necessity to make the enumer-
ated first amendment guarantees significant).
12. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
13. 10 ALA. CODE § 192-98 (1940).
14. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 450.
15. Id. at 460-61.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 465-66 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). In
Sweezy, the Supreme Court found that the first amendment protects a citizen's right to take
part in political associations. The Court recognized that the subordinating interest of the
State must be compelling.
18. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 211-12 (1986). The
Republican Party challenged the state requirement which permitted only members of that
party to vote in the party primary. The party prevailed by asserting that the requirement,
which directly conflicted with Republican aspirations to permit the independent voter to
vote in its primaries, violated the party's freedom of association. See also Democratic Party
of United States v. Wisconsin ex. rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 112 (1981); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
19. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (the Court held that litigation
is protected as a form of political expression); Brotherhood of R.R. Trailman v. Virginia ex.
rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (assembly and petition rights include the right to
legal help from an association).
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 484. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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while concluding his discussion on marital privacy. 22 In recognizing
marital privacy as a fundamental right of privacy, the Court based its
decision on general principals inherent in the Constitution, rather than
on particular constitutional language.
Thus, the Supreme Court introduced a right of expressive associa-
tion in Patterson,23 where individuals obtain standing when acting
through organizations. In addition, the Court in Griswold recognized a
right of intimate association protected by the first amendment, which
exists to protect marital couples who plan to procreate.
2 4
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
25
which distinguished between the two aspects of freedom of associa-
tion.2 6 The Court held that freedom of intimate association exists to
protect highly personal relationships. 2 7 Additionally, the Court defined
the freedom of expressive association as the right to associate with
others while exercising express first amendment activities.2 8
Thus, through history, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
rights of intimate and expressive association are subject to different
standards of review.2 9 Freedom of intimate association is given a higher
level of constitutional protection because it involves the fundamental
nature of personal liberty. 30 This freedom has not been extended to
protect unrelated individuals from government actions.31 The Supreme
Court has held that a state may only infringe on the freedom of expres-
sive association when such a freedom conflicts with a compelling state
interest.3 2 Yet, according to the Court's decision in Roberts, the infringe-
ment will not be allowed if the state interest can be achieved through a
less restrictive means.
33
In 1987, the Supreme Court was once again confronted with a free-
dom of association claim. In Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarle,34 the Supreme Court adopted the standard of re-
view used in Roberts.35 Justice Powell's majority opinion replaced inti-
mate association with the term "private association." The opinion
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. (receiving information on contraceptives is imperative
to exercising the fundamental right to make procreational choices).
23. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
24. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
25. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
26. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
27. See id. at 619 (protecting highly personal relationships from unjustified state inter-
ference "safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty.").
28. See id.; see also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S.
Ct. 1940, 1945 (1987).
29. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
30. See id. at 618 (affords "personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary");
see, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977).
31. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1986); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974).
32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
33. Id.
34. 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
35. See supra notes 25-33.
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expressly stated that private association is not limited to family relations;
rather, the Court found that it applies to a variety of personal rela-
tions.3 6 However, the Court established that there is no clear boundary
for activities protected under private association.3 7 While reviewing the
appellant's right of expressive association, the Court followed the proce-
dure set forth in Roberts.
38
B. The Evolution of Ascertaining "Distinctly Private"
The Civil Rights Act of 19643 9 bans discrimination supported by
state action or affected by interstate commerce. 40 The United States
Congress, through the commerce clause, is empowered to prohibit pri-
vate discrimination from affecting interstate commerce.4 1 Congress has
utilized its power under the commerce clause to regulate private race
and sex discrimination in education,
42 employment, 43 and housing.
4 4
However, Title II of the Civil Rights Act only prohibits discrimination
based on color, race, religion, or national origin.4 5 Furthermore, Title
II exempts "private clubs" from its scope of enforcement, 4 6 and this has
enabled a great number of groups and associations to be protected by
the exemption.4 7 Though the Act prohibits discrimination against par-
ticular groups,4 8 it fails to protect gender-based discrimination and
leaves the definition of "private club" open for broad interpretation.
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, most states
instituted their own anti-discrimination laws. The California 4 9 and Min-
nesota 50 public accommodation laws have been subjected to strict judi-
36. Duarte, 107 S. Ct. at 1947.
37. Id. at 1944-45. The Court recognized begetting and bearing children, child rear-
ing, education, marriage, and co-habitation with relatives as examples of protected private
association activities.
38. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982) [hereinafter "Civil Rights Act" or "Act"].
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1982).
41. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (makes sex discrimination unlawful in educational ac-
tivities that are federally funded); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) (prohibits discrimination based
on race in contracts for educational services); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
172 (1976).
43. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII addresses employment benefits); see also
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1964).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1983). The law states: "All persons shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982). This section of the law provides:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other estab-
lishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of
such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an estab-
lishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.
47. See generally Note, The Private Club Exemption To The Civil Rights Act of 1964: .4 Study
In Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112 (1969).
48. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
49. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
50. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West Supp. 1988).
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cial review,5 1 and are responsible for the first actual step toward
defining "distinctly private." The Minnesota Human Rights Act prohib-
its unfair discriminatory practice based on sex, race, color and other cat-
egories. 52 Thus, the law was one of the first state public accomodation
statutes to include "sex" as a forbidden basis of discrimination. As such,
it was inevitable that the Minnesota provision would be the focus of a
constitutional challenge.
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the struggle amidst the
equal access rights of women and the associational rights of a presuma-
bly private club for the first time in Roberts v. United StatesJaycees.53 The
Court's review of the Minnesota public accommodation law is the first
step toward defining "distinctly private." In Roberts, the St. Paul and
Minneapolis chapters of the Jaycees admitted women in 1974 and
1975; 5 4 subsequently, the United States Jaycees threatened to revoke
the local chapters' charters. 5 5 In response, members of the local chap-
ters filed complaints with the state department of human rights asserting
discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.56 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the Human Rights Act applied
to any "public business facility" and concluded the Jaycees fell within
that classification because they solicited membership on a nonselective
basis. After a federal district court affirmed the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 57 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota legislation and
found that Minnesota's highest court correctly applied the law to the
Jaycees.
5 8
In Roberts, the Supreme Court created a bifurcated framework for
the analysis of associational freedom.5 9 The Court failed to thoroughly
evaluate what characterized the Jaycees as a "public accommodation."
The Roberts Court simply accepted the findings of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, thus leaving the legitimate parameters of defining "distinctly
private" unresolved.
51. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West Supp. 1988). The public accommodation law
makes it unlawful "to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation
because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id.
53. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609. The United States Jaycees, founded in 1920, is a non-
profit corporation which was traditionally known as a mens club. Women are allowed as
associate members, but are not permitted to vote, hold office, or participate in all
activities.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 614.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text [hereinafter "Human Rights Act"].
57. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1982), revd, 709
F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), revd sub noma., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984).
58. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 630-31.
59. Id. at 629-30. See Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1901 (1984); see also Note, Private Club Discrimination Can Be Outlawed
Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 413, 423-24 (1985); see supra notes 25-33
and accompanying text.
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The California Unruh Act broadly defines public accommodations
to encompass "all business establishments of whatever kind." 60 The law
also prohibits discrimination based on sex,6 1 similar to the Minnesota
public accommodation law. In Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 6 2 the United States Supreme Court affirmed a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals decision ordering the reinstatement of a local
Rotary club that refused to abide by a male-only membership policy.
63
The Supreme Court limited its review of the case to determine if the
Unruh Act violated the first amendment freedom of association as ap-
plied to Rotary International and its member clubs. 64 The Court
adopted the standard of review established in Roberts6 5 to determine if
Rotary International was susceptible to the law. The Supreme Court
considered the exclusivity, purpose, selectivity, and size of the associa-
tion. 6 6 Recognizing that Rotary's activities include representation of the
business community, the Court found that the activities constituted pub-
lic purposes rather than exclusive private ends.6 7 In addition, the Court
found Rotary's willingness to seek publicity and to participate with other
organizations to attribute to its public purpose. Therefore, the Supreme
Court found the Unruh Act did not improperly infringe upon the Rotary
Club members' freedom of association.
6 8
In Duarte, the United States Supreme Court recognized the author-
ity of the states to prohibit sex discrimination through means of public
accommodation laws. The Court considered the club's purpose, size,
exclusivity, and selectivity to determine if it was "distinctly private.''69
The Court's failure to clearly define the characteristics of "distinctly pri-
vate" left an open door for further attempts to ascertain a standard test.
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts: New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of
New York
70
In reaction to the alleged networking and business conducted at its
60. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1987).
61. The Civil Rights Act reads: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are
free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges,
or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5i
(West Supp. 1982).
62. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d
1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
63. See Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1067-68, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
64. The Court did not review the issue of overbreadth and vagueness which Rotary
International claimed. Rotary, 107 S.Ct. at 1945.
65. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
66. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 620-21 (1984).
67. See Duarte, 107 S. Ct. at 1945-46 (local club membership is unlimited); see also
STANDARD ROTARY CLUB CONSTITUTION art. V, 3.
68. Duarte, 107 S. Ct. at 1947.
69. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21.
70. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
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exclusive, male only private clubs, the New York City Council enacted
Local Law 6371 on October 9, 1984. The law was an attempt to ascer-
tain and distinguish private clubs from public clubs.7 2 The 1984 amend-
ment (Local Law 63) goes one step further than the City's Human
Rights Law 73 in illustrating the difference between public and private
organizations. New York City's original Human Rights Law prohibits
discrimination in any "place of public accommodation, resort, or amuse-
ment" based on sex, race, creed and other categories, 74 but broadly ex-
empts places that are "distinctly private."75 Local Law 63 fills the
"distinctly private" void by providing three requirements which must
not exist for a club, or other place of accommodation to be deemed
"distinctly private." 76 If a club has more than 400 members, furnishes
regular meal service, and receives payment directly or indirectly on be-
half of or from non-members, it is no longer protected by the "distinctly
private" exemption.
Immediately following the New York City Council's enactment of
Local Law 63, the New York Club Association 77 filed suit in state court
seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment contending that under the first
and fourteenth amendments Local Law 63 was unconstitutional on its
face.
The trial court declared the ordinance constitutional and the state's
intermediate appellate court affirmed. 78 The state's highest court, the
71. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
72. LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION LOCAL LAWS No. 63 OF CITY OF NEW YORK § 1 (1984).
According to the findings of the City Council, the importance of this legislation was to
make apparent the City's "compelling interest in providing its citizens ... regardless of
race, creed, color, national origin or sex ... a fair and equal opportunity to participate in
the business and professional life of the City." Id.
73. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
74. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(2). The New York City Human Rights Law en-
acted in 1965 makes it:
[a]n unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee,
proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the race, creed, color, national
origin or sex of any person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny
to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges
thereof, or directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail
any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place
shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of race, creed,
color, national origin or sex of that the patronage or custom threat of any person
belonging to or purporting to be of any particular race, creed, color, national
origin, or sex is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited.
75. See id.
76. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). Local Law 63 provides that any:
institution, club or place of accommodation, other than a benevolent order or a
religious corporation, shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it
[I] has more than four hundred members, [2] provides regular meal service, and
[3] regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services,
meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of non-members for
the furtherance of trade or business.
77. The New York State Club Association, Inc. is a non-profit corporation made up of
a consortium of 125 private clubs and associations.
78. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 505 N.Y.S. 2d 152, 118
A.D.2d 392 (1986).
1988]
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Court of Appeals of New York also affirmed, 79 holding that the law does
not violate club members' freedom to privacy, free speech or associa-
tion.8 0 The court declared that through Local Law 63, the city facili-
tated the least restrictive means to achieve its end, 8 ' and that the law
was but a mere intrusion on protected freedom of association.8 2 The
New York State Club Association appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.
B. Reasoning
1. Majority Opinion
Justice White's majority opinion addressed four separate issues.
8 3
Among these issues the first amendment's freedom of association and
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection were the most relevant
constitutional concerns. The appellant's facial attack of Local Law 63's
constitutionality was found to have no merit and the law was upheld.
84
Addressing appellant's private association claim,8 5 the Court recognized
that when the first amendment's freedom of speech is at stake, it will
often allow a facial attack. Using the tests espoused in City Council v.
Taxpayer for Vincient,8 6 the Court cautioned a facial attack would only pre-
vail if the appellant could demonstrate one of two exceptions. Thus,
under the exceptions the appellant was responsible for proving that Lo-
cal Law 63 could either "never be applied in a valid manner" or be so
broad that it "may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third
79. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 505 N.E.2d
915 (1987).
80. Id. at 920-22. Without discussing it, the court also denied relief on the equal pro-
tection claim.
81. Id. at 92 1. The court held the law abridges on the policies and activities of the
clubs' only "to the extent necessary to ensure that they do not automatically exclude per-
sons from membership or use of the facilities on account of invidious discrimination." Id.
82. Id. at 921-22. The court stated that "[a]ny incidental intrusion on protected free
speech rights accomplished by the local measure is no greater than necessary to fulfill the
state's legitimate purpose in extending to them equal opportunity in employment." Id.
See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1984).
83. New York Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988). The first issue
addressed by the Court was one of standing. Relying on Hunt v. Washington Apple Ad-
vertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the Court held the club association had
standing to sue for the benefit of its members because "(a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interest it seeks to protect are germane to
the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested re-
quires participation of individual members in the lawsuit." See also Warth v. Seldin, 442
U.S. 490, 511 (1975). The Court cited WVarth while rejecting appellees contention that the
appellant's membership associations must have standing only to sue for their own benefit,
and not on anyone's behalf. In addition, the Court found that the appellant's member
associations have standing to bring the same suit on behalf of their own members because
these individuals "are suffering immediate or threatened injury" to their first amendment
rights as a consequence of the ordinances enactment. Id.
84. New York Club Assn, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
85. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. at 1947
(in reference to Court's past view' of "private association").
86. New York Club nss', 108 S. Ct. at 2233 (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincient, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)).
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parties regardless of its legal application." '8 7 In its analysis, the Court
acknowledged that both exceptions were narrow. 8 8 To qualify under
the first exception, every application of the law must create "an imper-
missible risk of suppression of ideas."18 9 To fall within the second ex-
ception the Court must find the law to be substantially overbroad,
posing a "realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compro-
mise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the
Court." 90 Subsequent to the appellant conceding that Local Law 63
could constitutionally apply to some of the larger clubs under the
Court's decisions in Rotary and Roberts,9 1 the Court found the appellant's
private association attack failed.
Citing Roberts, the Court denounced appellant's expressive associa-
tion claim and held that on its face Local Law 63 in no considerable way
affects the capability of individuals to develop associations that promote
public or private viewpoints. 9 2 While upholding the law, the Supreme
Court found that it could "hardly hold otherwise," because appellants'
facial attack offered no evidence of the characteristics of any of the clubs
it represented. 93 The Court concluded its discussion of freedom of ex-
pressive association by finding that the law does not mandate clubs to
"abandon or alter" any freedoms protected by the first amendment. 94
Also, the Court found Local Law 63 to be "no obstacle" to a club that
attempts to exclude individuals that do not hold the same views which
the club's members support.9 5 Recognizing the compelling interest of
the city, the Court found the law "merely prevents" a club or association
from using sex, race and other distinct characteristics as requirements
"in place of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for
determining membership."
9 6
Finally, the Court found the club association failed in its facial equal
protection attack on Local Law 63.97 The club association's claim was
premised on the exemption under the law which declares benevolent
orders and religious corporations to be "distinctly private."'9 8 Relying
87. Id. (quoting Taxpayer for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798).
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Taxpayersfor Vincient, 466 U.S. at 798, 801).
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
92. New York Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
93. Id. at 2234-35
94. Id. at 2234 (quoting Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1945).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 2235. Prior to addressing the issue of equal protection, the Court dis-
cussed appellant's "overbreadth" and "irrebuttable" presumption contention. Using the
test set forth in Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("a law is constitutional
unless it is substantially overbroad"), the Court found the overbreadth doctrine could not
apply because the appellant made no indication that any club's ability to associate or to
support private or public viewpoints was impaired by the law. The Court rejected appel-
lants "irrebuttable" presumption contention by finding the administrative and judicial
proceedings under the law are adequate to guarantee that whatever overbreadth that ex-
ists "will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts." Id. See also Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986).
98. New York Club Ass n, 108 S. Ct. at 2235.
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on Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, appellant asserted that benevolent
orders and religious corporations should be treated equal to private as-
sociations because appellee presented no evidence that one was actually
different from the other.9 9 Using the rational basis test, the Court did
not find appellant's argument to be convincing.
First, the Court supported the city council's reasoning that identi-
fied benevolent orders and religious corporations to be unique.' 0 0 It
paralleled the city's logic with the decision in Bryant which upheld a state
law that similarly exempted benevolent orders.' 0 ' Second, the Court
recognized that legislative classifications are assumed to be constitu-
tional, and held that the party challenging the constitutionality of a stat-
ute has the burden of showing it is unconstitutional. 10 2 The club
association failed because it did not provide evidence that indicated be-
nevolent orders and religious corporations are identical to its private
clubs which fall under Local Law 63's anti-discrimination provision.'
0 3
2. Concurring Opinions
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia each wrote concurring opin-
ions, with Justice Scalia concurring in part and in judgment. Agreeing
with the majority, the Justices' recognized that the appellant's facial free-
dom of association attack on Local Law 63 must fail. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy, assured that the majority opin-
ion does not threaten the significance of associational interests that may
be at stake. 10 4 Justice O'Connor's concurrence recognized the impor-
tance of balancing the states' power of ensuring "nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to commercial opportunities in our society" against an
"association's First Amendment right to control its membership."' 0 5
Acknowledging that the amount of commercial activity varies with each
organization, Justice O'Connor stated that there will definitely be clubs
that fall within the law's reach, but will be entitled to constitutional pro-
tection.' 0 6 However, the Justice concluded by stating that those organi-
zations which are predominately commercial will not be protected by the
first amendment's associational or expressive right to be free.
10 7
99. Id. at 2236 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985)).
100. See id. (citing New York ex. rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1928)).
In Bryant the Court upheld a law which exempted benevolent orders from filing certain
documents that most associations and corporations had to file with the state. See N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTs LAw § 53 (McKinney 1976).
101. New York Club Ass 'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111
(1979)). (Challenging party must convince the court that the legislative facts upon which
the classification is based could not reasonably be thought to be true by the government
body).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2236-37.
104. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 635 (1984) (O'Connor,J,
concurring in part)) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia's concurrence in part found the majority's equal pro-
tection rationale to be weak. He expressed dissatisfaction toward the
Court's reliance on the New York appellate division's statement defining
benevolent orders as "unique" because, as he pointed out, the state-
ment was cited incorrectly and does not define benevolent orders but
rather "fraternal benefit societies." 10 8 According to Justice Scalia, the
"mere fact that benevolent orders are unique" does not suffice to deter-
mine that a rational basis is present to allow an exemption.10 9 Addition-
ally, the Justice maintained that some reasonable connection must exist
between the respect in which they are unique and the objective of the
law. Therefore, Justice Scalia argued that the equal protection analysis
of the Court was not well-founded. 1 0
IV. ANALYSIS
Over a period of four years, the United States Supreme Court, in
three decisions, finally recognized that associational discrimination in al-
leged private clubs can be prohibited."I 1 A unanimous Supreme Court
held that nothing in the Constitution makes New York City's "three-
prong test" unlawful. 1 2 New York Club Association opened the door for
women to become members of the once exclusive men's clubs. Our so-
ciety cherishes personal liberty in one's home' 13 and in private associa-
tion,' 14 but at the same time fairness in the marketplace has become a
compelling state interest.'' 5 In an attempt to remedy these conflicting
values, the Supreme Court recognized a legitimate definition of "dis-
tinctly private,"' 16 and in doing so, the Court has left many members of
society with mixed feelings.
Associational rights have suffered a great loss due to the interests of
the state. Focusing on the size and commercial activities of clubs,' 17
New York City structured a paradigm for other cities and states to fol-
low. In fact, numerous other cities have enacted similar laws, including
the District of Columbia, Chicago, Buffalo, Los Angeles, and San Fran-
cisco. i8 Justices Samuel Warren's and Louis Brandeis' "right to be left
alone"' 19 has been compromised by the Court's acknowledgment of the
108. See id. at 2238 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
109. Id.
I10. Id.
11. See New York Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988); Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
112. See supra notes 70-109 and accompanying text.
113. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
114. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
115. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 70-109 and accompanying text.
117. See LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION, supra note 75. The City relied on considerations
which guided the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), to uphold Local Law 63.
118. WASHINGTON, D.C., CODE § 1-2502; CHICAGO, ILL., MON. CODE ch. 199A; BUF-
FALO, N.Y., CiTY ORD., Art. XXIII of Chap. VII; Los ANGELES, CA., MUN. CODE
§§ 44.95.00-44.95.04; SAN FRANCISCO, CA., POLICE CODE, §§ 3300BI-3300B.7.
119. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). There is
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changing role of women in our society. No longer will men be capable
of enjoying the "right to be left alone" at their once private clubs.
Alexis de Tocqueville, in his commentary on the role of democracy in
America, found that the propensity in the United States to establish pri-
vate associations derives from and is preserved by the inalienable right
of private association, which he cautioned against limiting:
The most natural privilege of man next to the right of act-
ing for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of
his fellow creatures and acting in common with them. The
right of association therefor appears to be almost as inalienable
in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can
attack it without impairing the foundations of society.
I2 0
Therefore, it could be tempting to conclude that the Court in New York
Club Association12 l should have weighed the right of association to be
greater than the compelling interest of the City. However, the Court
was correct in finding Local Law 63 valid on its face.
The development of civilization requires change. The needs of
human beings are met through communicating, negotiating, implement-
ing, and enforcing laws, or in the extreme event, war. When tradition
and individual attitudes stand in the way of the evolution of society, the
American legal system must confront the issue. 122 The New York City
Council operated as an effective government body by enacting Local
Law 63. Though the New York Club Association contended that the law
rests on a baseless assumption categorizing clubs as marketplaces for
business opportunities, the reality of the situation is that business does
take place at both private and public clubs.
The suppression of business opportunities based on gender impairs
the economy of the United States. Women make up a large percentage
of our workforce and to prohibit their admittance to venues where busi-
ness is conducted deprives the nation of potential economic growth.123
In New York Club Association, the United States Supreme Court's decision
is just from both a moral and economic standpoint. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court decision is legally well-founded, giving women the op-
portunity to compete with their male counterparts.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Club Associ-
ation is equitable and correct for many reasons. First, while attempting a
facial expressive association attack on Local Law 63, the club association
offered no evidence to the Court displaying the characteristics or pur-
no express constitutional right to privacy. Justice Brandeis introduced the right into case
law in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
120. Brief of the Conference of Private Organizations as Amicus Curiae for Appellant
at 2, New York Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (quoting A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 196 (Bradley ed. 1954)).
121. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
122. Perhaps one of the most important pieces of legislation enacted was the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. For a short period of time, the anti-discrimination law was not widely
accepted by certain members of society. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1983).
123. Employment in Perspective-Women In The Labor Force, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
Rep. 756 (1988) (56.2% of people in the work force are women).
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pose of any represented club.' 2 4 Second, in its equal protection facial
attack, the club association failed again to provide the Court with any
evidence identifying benevolent orders and religious organizations to be
identical to private clubs.' 2 5 Therefore, without evidence to the con-
trary, the Supreme Court had no alternative but to find the club associa-
tion's claim to be without merit. Third, the club association conceded
that Local Law 63 could apply constitutionally to some of the larger
clubs, thus making its facial attack untenable. 12 6 The purpose of a facial
attack is to allege that the law is invalid in all applications, yet the club
association expressly acknowledged that the law was valid when applied
to some clubs. Finally, although the United States Supreme Court
struck down the club association's facial attack on the constitutionality of
Local Law 63, the Court did recognize that the ordinance could be un-
constitutional if applied to certain clubs. 127 The Court stressed a case-
by-case analysis of those clubs or associations that provide evidence to
demonstrate how their specific purpose is being impaired, proving the
ordinance invalid as it applied to that given club. 12 8 Therefore, clubs
that can actually demonstrate how their right to association is being in-
fringed upon by Local Law 63 should be successful in maintaining their
exclusive membership.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Club Associ-
ation has finally defined "distinctly private" as it may be applied in public
accommodation laws. At the same time, the decision has infringed upon
the right of private and expressive freedom of association. Women have
gained access to traditional men-only clubs at the expense of individual
privacy. Unfortunately, access will not guarantee business, and only
time will tell how women have benefitted from the Court's decision.
However, our society as a whole has profited by identifying the equally
important role women play in the business world. New York City's
"three-prong test" should be adopted by all cities and states, and if a
club feels that it has a legitimate argument, it should go forth with evi-
dence and attempt to prove it. The United States Supreme Court has
finally brought womens' business opportunities up to date, and in doing
so, the Court in New York Club Association utilized its power to terminate
one of this country's most oppressive traditions.
Kurt Frederick Overhardt
124. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Compare this argument with Justice
Scalia's discussion on equal protection. New York Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S.
Ct. 2225, 2238 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
126. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
127. New York Ctub Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234, 2237-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 2235.
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